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IN THE SUPRE~IB COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH SORENSON,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

GARY E. BEERS and EVELYN
BEERS, his wife; JEFFREY
'1ERRILL and CELESTE B.
>!ERRILL, his wife; MATT
BIWANIC and LOCKHART CO.,

Case No. 15477

DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff, a defaulting trustor under
a deed of trust, seeks to have a trustee's sale thereunder set aside and
title revested in her free and clear of all claims of all of the defendants
because of an alleged oral agreement with defendants that she could repurchase the property from them, which she alleged constituted fraud and a
conspiracy to deprive her of the property.
Defendants filed a counter claim claiming that plaintiff was in
unlawful detainer of the property and praying for damages for rental value
during the period of plaintiff's detention.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court, with the Honorable David B. Dee presiding,
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing without
prejudice the plaintiff's complaint and granting judgment to the defendants
Beers, Merrill and Biljanic on their counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the summary judgment entered by the court
vacated and set aside, and the case remanded to the District Court for trial
on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 29, 1975, plaintiff executed a trust deed to the
Lockhart Company securing a promissory note, which trust deed covered a
parcel of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, upon which is
situated a beer tavern known as Lefty's Lounge.

Following plaintiff's

default under the provisions of the promissory note secured by the trust
deed, the Lockhart Company, through its successor trustee, W. Clark Burt,
recorded on November 23, 1976, a declaration of default and demand for
sale, and gave notice of a trustee's sale to be held April 1, 1977.
On the evening of March 31, 1977, plaintiff initiated a telephone
conversation with the defendant Matt Biljanic, regarding the trustee's sale
to be held the following afternoon.

During the conversation, plaintiff

"stated to him that she could not have the necessary money ready by April 1,
1977."

(plaintiff's affidavit, R-25)

From this telephone conversation,
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plaintiff understood that defendant Biljanic would buy the property at the
trustee's sale and give

her an opportunity to buy it back, with some extra

payment for his services.

(plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plaintiff's deposi-

tion, pages 6 and 48)
On April 1, 1977, the trustee's sale was held, and the defendant

Gary E. Beers, as the highest bidder, purchased the property for the sum
of $40,593.93.

This purchase was made on behalf of the defendants Beers

and Biljanic, who were to share equally in the transaction.

(Biljanic

deposition, page 24; Beers deposition, page 11)
Later, on April 1, 1977, and subsequent to the trustee's sale,
plaintiff again telephoned defendant Biljanic who advised her that he and
the defendant Beers had purchased the property, and that she should contact
the defendant Beers for details on purchasing the pr9perty back from them.
(plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plaintiff's deposition, pages 6 and 7)
On April 2, 1977, plaintiff met with defendant Beers who advised
her that in order for her to purchase the property, that it would cost her

$5,000.00 for defendant Beers, and $5,000.00 for defendant Biljanic, over
what they had paid for the property.
tiff's deposition, page

(plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plain~

6, 7 and 8; Biljanic's deposition, pages 18 and

19)

On April 5, 1977, plaintiff met again with defendant Beers and
agreed to pay defendants Beers and Biljanic $500.00 per month as rent to
occupy the premises and operate "Lefty's Lounge".
Pages ll and 12)

(plaintiff's deposition

During the time plaintiff occupied the premises no rent
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was in fact paid to the defendants Beers and Biljanic even though she received the income from the operation of the tavern.

On May 3, 1977, a

:lot ice to Quit was served upon the plaintiff, but she continued to occupy

the premises through October 11, 1977, when the premises were restored to
the defendants.

(plaintiff's deposition, pages 53 and 54)

On April 26, 1977, plaintiff telephoned defendant Biljanic who
advised her at that time that he would accept $5,000.00 to permit her to
repurchase the property, but that defendant Beers wanted $10,000.00 in
order for her to repurchase the property.

(plaintiff's affidavit R-27)

After the sale was made and the trustee's deed issued, the
defendant Beers placed the names of the defendant Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey
Merrill and Celeste B. Merrill on the deed, since they were participating
with Beers and Biljanic in the transaction.

(Beers deposition, page 33)

As a result of the April 26, 1977 conversation with defendant
Biljanic, plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on April 26, 1977.

An amended complaint was filed on May 11, 1977.

Defendants Beers, Biljanic

and Merrill filed an answer and a counterclaim on May 25, 1977, alleging
plaintiff to be guilty of an unlawful detainer, and praying for damages for
rental value and for any waste.

Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment on May 25, 1977, which was denied on June 16, 1977, in order for
the plaintiff to take the depositions of defendants Biljanic, Beers and
the Lockhart Company.

Depositions were taken and defendants filed their

motion for summary judgment on July 13, 1977, moving the court to dismiss
plaintiff's amended compalint and asking the court to grant judgment in
favor of the defendants Beers, Biljanic and Merrill on their counterclaim.
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While this motion was pending, plaintiff filed her second amended complaint,
which added a third cause of action.

Defendant's motion for summary judg-

ment was heard by the court, and the court entered a final order granting
a summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff on
September 28, 1977.
1.

This summary judgment granted by the court provided:
That plaintfff's second amended complaint was

dismissed without prejudice.
2.

That defendants were entitled to recover possession

of the real property from the plaintiff.
3.

That the defendants were awarded judgment against

the plaintiff in the sum of $2,833.33 for the rental value
of the premises during the period of detention by the
plaintiff, and $132.95 for costs.
It is from the summary judgment granted by the court that this
appeal is taken.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED AS A MATTER OF

LAW BECAUSE IT SOUGHT RELIEF CONTRARY ID THE PROVISIONS OF 57-1-28,
58-1-31, 25-5-3 AND 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953).
Plaintiff in her first cause of action .of her second amended
complaint sought to have the trustee's sale set aside and title to "Lefty's
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Lounge" revested in her free and clear of all claims of all of the defendants.

After an in court, paragraph by paragraph analysis of the first

cause of action the lower court ruled that the relief sought was contrary
to the provisions of 57-1-28, 57-1-31, 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953).
In paragraph 2 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second
amended complaint she alleged that the purchase of "Lefty's Lounge" by
defendant Beers at the trustee's sale was accomplished through fraudulent
representation to the Lockhart Company that defendants Biljanic and Beers
were representing the plaintiff.

In paragraph 3 thereof she alleged that the sale did not take
place at the time and place stated in the notice of sale.
In paragraph 4 thereof she alleged that but for the deception of
the defendants the sale would not have taken place and that at the time of
the sale plaintiff had made arrangements for the purchase of said property.
(second a.mended complaint, R-95)
With respect to all of these allegations, the lower court found
that they were contrary to the recitals contained in the trustee's deed
upon sale, which states that on April 1, 1977, at 12: 00 noon, at the Court's
Building, Gary E. Beers as the highest bidder, purchased Lefty's Lounge
for $40,593.93.

The lower court, relying in part on 57-1-28 U.C.A. (1953),

found that the trustee's deed itself was conclusive evidence that the sale
did in fact take place at the time and place set forth in the notice of
Sale.

Section 57-1-28(1) U.C.A. (1953) reads:
"The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance
with the requirements of the act relating to the exercise of
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the power of sale and the sale of property described therein,
including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery
and publication of the notice of default, any mailing and
the publication and posting of notice of sale, and the conduct
of sale and such recitals shall constitute prima facia
evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof
in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value
and without notice."
The court determined that plaintiff's allegation that the sale
did not take place as stated in the notice of sale was based on the word
of two of plaintiff's friends, Koslowski and Jones, who reported that they
" ••• didn't see any action around the area of the sale."

(plaintiff's

deposition, page 22; affidavit of Jones, R-21; affidavit of Koslowski, R-23)
The court then held that the Koslowski and Jones statements did not raise
a material issue of fact, but simply determined that both Koslowski and
Jones were in the vacinity of the courthouse at approximately noon on April
1, 1977, and that they did not personally witness the trustee's sale.
With respect to paragraph 4 of plaintiff's first cause of action
of the second amended complaint, the lower court found that plaintiff's
allegations that at the time and place of the sale she had made arrangements
for the purchase of the property was contrary to the statement contained in
Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's affidavit (plaintiff's affidavit, R-25) and contrary to her testimony that she did not have the necessary money on April 1,
1977 to redeem the property (plaintiff's deposition, page 5)

The lower
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court also found the allegations contained therein that defendants Biljanic
and Beers purchased the property for $40,593.93 knowing full well that the
value of the property was in excess thereof was immaterial in that the
trustee's deed recited that defendant Beers was the highest bidder, and that
was all :that was required under the trust deed statute, 57-1-28 U.C.A. (1953).
Paragraph

6 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second

aJ11ended complaint alleged an oral agreement wherein defendants Biljanic and
Beers "indicated" that they would allow plaintiff, to purc~ase the property
for an additional $5,000.00 over and above the purchase price paid at the
trustee's sale, when in fact said defendants intended to sell it for whatever the market would bear.

(second amended complaint, R-96)

The lower court found that if, by that allegation, plaintiff
claimed an oral agreement to sell the property which the defendants' Biljanic
and Beers breached, th.at such· an alleged agreement wouid be uninforceable
under the provisions of 25-5-3 U.C.A. (1953) which provides that:
"Every contract ••• for the sale of any land, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless. the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to whom the ••• sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing."
The court also found that ii' by the allegations in paragraphs 2
and 6 of plain.tif:f's first cause of action of the second ·amended complaint,
she was claiming an oral agreement whereby defendants Biljanic and Beers
were to redeem the property for her, that the agreement was barred by the
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provisions of 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953) which similarly provides that:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith;
every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another."
The lower court found that the first cause of action of plaintiff's
second amended complaint wherein the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring
the trustee's sale void and revesting title in her free and clear of all
claims of all of the defendants (second amended complaint, R-98) was contrary to the provisions of 57-1-28( 2) U.C.A. (1953) which provided that the
trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of
redemption, the trustee's title, and all of the right, title and interest
and claim of the turstor, which in this case is the plaintiff.

The court

found further that the first cause of action of the second amended complaint
was simply an attempt to circumvent the requirements of 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953)
which sets forth the only wa:;r that the plaintiff could cure the default and
reinstate the trust deed; and it found that those requirements needed to have
been accomplished within three months of the notice and prior to the trustee's
sale, which plaintiff failed to do.
POINT II

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED TO SET FORTH A STATEMENT OF FACTS TO

SUPPORT A CLAIM OF FRAUD.
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The lower court found that the allegations that defendnats Biljanic
and Beers agreed to allow plaintiff to purchase the property for $10,000.00

over and above the purchase price paid at the trustee's sale, when in fact

they intended to sell it for whatever the market would bear, did not allege
facts sufficient to establish fraud because the alleged representations were
promissory in nature only.

(second amended complaint, R-96)

The court relied

on Adamson v. Brockbank, ll2 Ut •. 2d 52, 185 P.2d 269 (1947) at 276, wherein
the Utah Supreme Court stated that in order to constitute actionable fraud,
the false representations must relate to past or present facts and cannot
be merely promissory or expressions of opinions.
The lower court found further that the fact that defendants refused to sell to plaintiff at the orally agreed price did not constitute
fraud either, relying on Schow v. Guartone, 18 Ut. 2d 135, 417 P.2d 643
(1966) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that the fact that a promiser
failed to perform his promise would not suffice to make out a charge of
fraud.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE ALTERATION OF THE TRUSTEE'S
DEED DID NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENT AS BETWEEN THE SUCCESSOR
TRUSTEE AND DEFENDANT BEERS.

Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second
amended complaint alleged that the trustee 1 s deed was altered by defendant
Beers to include as additional grantees defendants Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey
Merrill and Celeste Merrill.

(second a.mended complaint, R-96)

The lower
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court properly ruled that the effect of the alteration had no bearing on
the outcome of this case.

The alteration was made by defendant Beers in

an attempt to create a co-tenancy between defendants Gary E. Beers, Evelyn
Beers, Jeffrey Merrill and Celeste Merrill,

(Beers deposition, page 39)

Following the reasoning set forth in 4 Am Jur 2nd, Alteration of Instruments, Section

47

at page

45,

the lower court held that the attempt at

creating a co-tenancy was void and that the alteration should, as a matter
of law, be ignored, but, that the trustee's deed was val.id and inforceable
according to its original terms as between the trustee and defendant Beers.

POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE THIRD
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER RULES 8 AND 12 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The lower court, after consideration of the third cause of action
of plaintiff's second amended complaint, granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss without prejudice under Rules 8 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The lower court found that the third cause of action of the second
a.mended complaint, as written, did not give defendants sufficient notice
of the nature or substance of the acts allegedly committed by the defendants,
nor did it sufficiently set forth the legal grounds under which plaintiff
sought relief.
Paragraph 2 thereof alleged that the defendant Biljanic, as a
member of the Utah State Bar, was bound by the cannons of ethics thereof.

-11-
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Paragraph 3 thereof alleged that the plaintiff contacted defendant
3iljanic on March 31, 1977, and requested that he represent her at the
Grustee's sale set the following day and that said defendant agreed to
such representation.
Paragraph 4 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic failed and
neglected to inform plaintiff that he could not represent her because he
had already represented another client in a proposed action against the
plaintiff, and further that he had resolved to bid on the property for hilllself and others.
Paragraph 5 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic, in concert
with others, appeared at the sale and purchased the property for hilllself
rather than bid for and on behalf of the plaintiff.
Paragraph

6 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic, acted in a

manner calculated to mislead and deceive the plaintiff, and that at no tillle
did he act in a manner consistent with the cannons of ethics of the profession of the practice of law.
Paragraph 7 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic was aided
and abedded by defendant Gary Beers, Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey Merrill and
Celeste Merrill in the conspiracy.
Finally, paragraph 8 thereof alleged that in aid of the conspiracy, defendants Beers and Biljanic, represented to the Lockhart Company
that they were acting for and on behalf of plaintiff.
Following the rules set forth in Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Ut.2d

157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). that under Rules 8 and 12 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure a complaint is required to give the opposing parties fair
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notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.

The lower court found that while

paragraphs 2 through 8 of the third cause of action alleged a breach of the
cannons of ethics by defendant Biljanic and a conspiracy with the remaining
defendants, that plaintiff had not alleged acts or conduct by the defendants
with sufficient particularity to set forth the elliments of a claim for fraud,
malpractice, breach of contract or conspiracy, and that therefore the third
cause of action as written failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
The lower court was correct in its ruling, since in general a
civil conspiracy must allege a combination of two or more persons by some
concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose which causes injury to
the plaintiff.

(16 Am Jur 2nd, Conspiracy, Section 43)

Plaintiff's primary

complaint is that defendants bid and purchased the property at the trustee's
sale for themselves rather than for her.

Apart from the fact that the alle-

gation is barred by the provisions of 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953), as long as
the defendants sought only to further their own fair interest, they cannot
be liable as part of a conspiracy for any incidental damage to the plaintiff.

(16

Am Jur 2nd, Conspiracy, Section 43)

Even if defendants purchased the

property at the trustee's sale for themselves and not for the plaintiff,
they cannot be liable for a conspiracy for a lawful act.

The act in this

case was defendants' bidding in at a trustee's sale which any member of the
public was entitled to bid on.

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO
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A SUMMAB.Y JUDGMENT ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.
The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on their counterclaim which was brought under the unlawful detainer statute,

78-36-2 U.C.A. (1953) for restitution of the premises and judgment against
plaintiff for damages for the rental value or- reasonable value for the use
and occupancy of the pr-emises during the period of detention by the plaintiff.
The lower court found that defendant Beers purchased the proper-ty
on behalf of defendants Beers and Bilj anic at the trustee's sale held on
April 1, 1977.

(Hogge deposition, page 8; Biljanic deposition, page 24;

Beers deposition, page 11)

And that on April 5, 1977 plaintiff agreed to

pay defendants $500.00 per month as rent in order to use and occupy the
premises.

(plaintiff's deposition, pages 11 and 12)
The lower court found fur-ther that on May 13, 1977 a notice to

quit was ser-ved on the plaintiff by defendnats, (Sorensen deposition, page
54; Beers deposition, page 40; and Beers Exhibit No. 2) and that plaintiff
was occupying the premises and had occupied the premises since April 5, 1977,
without having made any rent payment even though during this period of time
she collected the income from the operation of "Lefty's Lounge".

(Sorensen

deposition, pages 53 and 54)
On this basis, the lower court granted defendants a judgment
ordering that defendants were entitled to recover possession of the real
property from the plaintiff and that defendants were entitled to a judgment
against the plaintiff in the sum of $2,.833.33 for the rental value of the
property for the use and occupancy of the premises during the period of
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detention by the plaintiff.
The lower court relied for its authority on the California case
of Abraha.mer v. Parks, 269 P. 2d 341 ( 1956), which involved the following
facts.

The defendant [in this case the plaintiff] executed a trust deed

as security for the payment of a promissory note.

The defendant then de-

faulted and the trustee sold the property to the plaintiff [the defendants
in this case].

Plaintiff gave the defendant, who was in possession, a three

day notice to quit and the defendant refused to quit.

Plaintiff then

brought an unlawful detainer action to recover possession of the property
[defendants' counterclaim in this case].

The California Supreme Court held

that all the plaintiff had to prove was the acquisition of the property at
a trustee's sale and the service of notice to quit on defendant.
was not required to prove more with respect to title.

Plaintiff

The court also held

that issues raised by the defendant as to whether the defendant was actually
in default and whether plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser and encumbrancer
for value without notice could not be litigated.
The lower court simply relied upon the testimony of the plaintiff
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim.
POINT VI
SUMMARY' JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THE FACTS AS ASSERTED BY THE
PARTY RULED AGAINST ESTABLISH THAT THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDG-

MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The plaintiff on appeal alleges that the lower court erred in
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because there were numer-

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ous material facts at issue.
Not only does the plaintiff not specifically set forth what facts
were at issue, and how they wuld alter the outcome of the case, but she
overlooks the careful examination the lower court gave the second amended
complaint, the documentary evidence and the depositions on file in this
case, in arriving at its decision.

In ruling on the motion, the court only

considered those facts which were not in dispute, using plaintiff's own
testimony, or her allegations contained in the second amended complaint,
in arriving at its decision that defendnats were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The defendants agree with Justice Crocket's statement in his
opinion in the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (1975) wherein
he stated:
"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties,
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence.

Neither is it to

deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed is.sues
of fact.

Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and

expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against• he would not be entitled
to prevail.

Only when it so appears, is the court justified

in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his
evidence and attempting to persuade the trier of facts to
his views.

Conversely, if there is any dispute as t9 any

issue, material to the settlement of the controversy, the
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summary judgment should not be granted."
The lower court properly concluded that in spite of everything
contended by the plaintiff, the defendants were entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, as more specifically set forth in Points I through VI of
defendants' brief.

To quote again from Justice Crocket in F & A Financial.

Corporation v. Bills, Inc., 17 Ut.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) at page 71.
"The granting of the summary judgment under those
circumstances had the salutary effect of saving the time,
effort and expense which would have been involved in having
a trial, which could have served no useful purpose.''
CONCLUSION
It is necessary to look at this case in perspective.

The plain-

tiff is a defaulting trustor under. a trust deed, who by her own testimony
was unable to redeem the property and reinstate the trust deed within the
three month time period prescribed by 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953).

It should

also be remembered that the Lockhart Company gave plaintiff not only the
minimum three month period as prescribed by that statute, but allowed her
over five months, and plaintiff still was unable to cure the default within
that time.

Now plaintiff is seeking to get around the fact that she failed

to cure the default and reinstate the trust deed by attempting to set aside
the trustee's sale because of an alleged oral agreement that hll.!i its origins
in a telephone conversation the very night before the trustee's sale and on
several conversations subsequent to the sale, which plaintiff contends culminated in an agreement whereby she could repurchase the proeprty from the
defendants for $10,000.00 over and above the purchase price paid by the
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defendants at the trustee's sale.
The lower court found properly that all the plaintiff was attempting to do was circumvent the req_uirements of 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953), and

that the relief she sought was contrary to the provisions of 57-1-28(2)
u.c.A. (1953) which provides that the trust deed shall operate to convey
to the purchaser without right of redemption the trustee's title and all
right, title and interest and claim of the plaintiff,

The lower court

also found that the relief plaintiff sought was barred by 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(2)
U.C.A. (1953), and that further plaintiff had failed to set forth a statement of facts sufficient to support either a claim of fraud or conspiracy.
By dismissing plaintifff's second a.mended complaint without prejudice and

granting defendants' judgment under their counterclaim, the trial court
saved both parties the time and expense and burden of a trial that would
have ultimately resulted in the same verdict against

plaintiff~

Respectfully submitted,

KEITH BIESINGER
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